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Abstract 
 
This study examines the stock-price reactions to analyst forecast revisions around 
earnings announcements to test whether pre-announcement forecasts reflect analysts’ 
private information or piggybacking on confounding events and news. We find that 
management earnings forecasts influence the timing and precision of analyst forecasts. 
More importantly, evidence suggests that prior studies’ finding of weaker (stronger) 
stock-price responses to forecast revisions in the period immediately after (before) the 
prior-quarter earnings announcement disappears once management earnings forecasts are 
controlled for. To the extent that management earnings forecasts are public disclosures, 
our results suggest that the importance of analysts' information discovery role 
documented in prior studies is likely to be overstated. 
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Management Earnings Forecasts and Value of Analyst Forecast Revisions 
 
1. Introduction  
Recent studies show that analysts piggyback their recommendations (Altınkılıç and Hansen 2009, 
Loh and Stulz 2011) and earnings forecasts (Altınkılıç et al. 2013) on recent news and events, and this 
ignites a debate over analysts’ behavior: Do analysts often provide new information with their reports, or 
do they instead usually piggyback their reports on recent public information, providing little new 
information? The growing evidence on piggybacking, however, does not include the important case of 
analyst forecasts around earnings announcements, which requires further examination, because previous 
studies credit strong pre-announcement stock-price reactions to significant new information from 
analysts. This study examines the stock-price reactions to analyst forecast revisions around earnings 
announcements to test whether pre-announcement forecasts reflect analysts’ private information or 
piggybacking on confounding events and news.   
Prior studies suggest that analysts add value through either the discovery of private information and/or 
their superior ability to produce information by processing public information (Francis et al. 2002, Ivković and 
Jegadeesh 2004, Frankel et al. 2006, Chen et al. 2010). These studies posit that analyst forecast revisions after 
an earnings announcement are more likely to reflect analysts’ ability to process earnings news and that 
revisions before the earnings announcement are more likely to capture analysts’ discovery of new private 
information. One study that is closely related to our inquiry is Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004). Ivković and 
Jegadeesh (2004) find that stock-price reactions to revisions are weakest in the first few weeks after prior-
quarter earnings announcements and stronger in the week before current-quarter earnings announcements.1 
They conclude that the value of analyst forecasts stems primarily from analysts’ ability to collect and process 
private information, consistent with the so-called “informed analyst hypothesis.” Ivković and Jegadeesh 
(2004), however, neither control for the confounding effect of public disclosures nor consider analysts’ 
                                                          
1 In contrast, findings in Francis et al. (2002) and Frankel et al. (2006) are consistent with the role of processing 
public information as a dominant source of value in analysts’ research. Francis et al. (2002), for example, find a 
positive association between the market reaction to earnings announcements and the market reaction to analysts’ 
research reports, suggesting that analyst research and earnings announcements are complements of each other. 
 2
piggybacking behavior. Analysts’ piggybacking on public disclosures may explain patterns of return reactions 
to analyst forecast revisions.  
Recent studies suggest that analysts piggyback their reports on recent public information (Altınkılıç 
and Hansen 2009, Altınkılıç et al. 2013), implying that analyst forecasts could be linked to news and events 
that confound stock-price reactions to analyst forecasts. Altınkılıç and Hansen (2009) report evidence that 
average recommendation revisions do not produce an economically meaningful market reaction after 
removing recommendations that piggyback on firm news, such as earnings announcements and management 
forecasts. Loh and Stulz (2011) find that only 12% of recommendation changes and 5% of earnings forecast 
revisions are influential and have a visible stock-price impact. Altınkılıç et al. (2013) show that nearly all 
analyst forecast revisions follow significant public information events and that forecast announcements have 
little information when there is no public information event. All three studies note that management forecast is 
an important information event that could confound return reactions to analyst reports. 
While both management forecasts and analyst forecasts are motivated by a desire to align investor 
expectations with the information they possess, analysts rely heavily on management forecasts in forming 
their expectations. Prior studies show that management forecasts influence analyst forecasts (e.g., 
Baginski and Hassell 1990, Cotter et al. 2006) and stock prices (Patell 1976, Penman 1980, Pownall et al. 
1993). Management earnings forecasts, especially those issued just before earnings announcements are 
tantamount to a full revelation of the firm’s actual earnings. For analysts who want to be accurate in their 
forecasts, prompt piggybacking of forecasts on earnings and guidance announcements is essential and 
easy. Earlier studies (e.g., Patell 1976, Jennings 1987) find that analysts update their forecasts in response 
to management forecasts. Evidence in Cotter et al. (2006) suggests that approximately 60 percent of 
analysts revise their forecasts within five days of management forecasts. Therefore, the temporal pattern 
of management forecasts can affect the temporal pattern of analyst forecast revisions, as well as the value 
that investors attach to forecast revisions across the event time.2 
                                                          
2 Livnat and Zhang (2012) find that market reactions to forecast revisions issued promptly (within three trading 
days) after corporate disclosures, such as 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K filings, are greater than reactions to non-prompt 
revisions. They conclude that investors place more value on analysts’ ability to interpret public disclosures. 
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 This study introduces new and unique tests of the “informed analyst hypothesis” and the 
“piggybacking hypothesis,” which are now central in the debate over analysts’ economic roles. The tests 
focus on piggybacking behavior around corporate announcements of earnings and management forecasts. 
Drawing on the empirical design and the statistics introduced by Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004), we 
examine whether management forecasts are associated with the timing, relative accuracy, and price 
impact of analyst forecast revisions. Specifically, we partition the sample revisions into two subsamples: 
revisions for firms that issue management forecasts and those for firms that do not issue management 
forecasts during the quarter. We then compare the revision timing, relative forecast accuracy, and stock-
price responses to analyst forecast revisions between the two subsamples.  
We first document that management forecasts and analyst forecast revisions during the quarter have 
very similar temporal patterns, which is consistent with analysts updating forecasts in response to management 
forecasts (e.g., Patell 1976, Jennings 1987). Interestingly, for firms issuing management forecasts, the temporal 
pattern of relative forecast accuracy and that of management forecasts are remarkably similar. Specifically, 
relative forecast accuracy is greater (i.e., revised analyst forecasts are more accurate relative to the existing 
consensus forecast) in weeks during which firms issue management forecasts more frequently. Relative 
forecast accuracy is also greater for firms with management forecasts than for firms without such forecasts, 
suggesting that analysts piggyback their revisions on management forecasts.  
More importantly, we find that the evidence of weaker (stronger) price reactions to forecast revisions 
issued immediately after (before) the earnings announcement holds only for the sample of firms that issue 
management forecasts. For firms without management forecasts, we find no statistical difference between 
stock-price reactions to revisions in the post-announcement period and those in the pre-announcement period. 
In addition, stock-price responses to forecast revisions are greater for firms with management forecasts than for 
firms without management forecasts in the pre-announcement period, while the opposite holds in the post-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Although we agree that ignoring other significant public corporate disclosures could result in erroneous conclusions, 
we note difficulties in disentangling the information content of the forecast revision from that of the firm disclosure 
itself. The stronger market reaction to prompt revisions may just reflect responses to the disclosures. 
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announcement period. The temporal pattern of management forecasts seems to be related to these differences 
in the temporal pattern of the information content between firms with and without management forecasts.  
We also directly control for news from management forecasts issued immediately before or 
concurrently with analyst forecast revisions. We show that weaker (stronger) price reactions to forecast 
revisions issued immediately after (before) the earnings announcement disappear once we control for 
management forecast news in the regression. Given that a management forecast is a public disclosure, this 
evidence casts doubt on the information role of analysts. Rather, the evidence is consistent with analysts 
piggybacking on recent information events.  
 The sample period is also partitioned into pre- and post-Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) 
periods. Reg FD changes the way that firms communicate with financial analysts and hence changes 
analysts’ information environment. Prior studies (e.g., Irani and Karamanou 2003, Agrawal et al. 2006, 
Janakiraman et al. 2007, Hahn and Song 2013) document a decrease in analyst following, forecast 
accuracy, and first-forecast horizon, as well as an increase in analyst forecast dispersion following Reg 
FD. Kross and Suk (2012) show that Reg FD also influences the interplay between management forecasts 
and analyst forecast revisions. Because these changes could affect the value of analyst forecast revisions 
at different points during the event time, the timing and information content of analyst forecast revisions 
in pre- and post-Reg FD periods are examined separately. Our results are robust in both pre and post-FD 
periods. In addition, management forecasts are more concentrated in the earnings announcement period during 
the post-Reg FD period, while most management forecasts are issued later in the quarter during the pre-Reg 
FD period. This shift in the temporal pattern around Reg FD is also apparent in analyst forecast revisions, 
providing additional support for the piggybacking hypothesis. 
Sample-selection bias is a potential issue for our analyses. That is, firms that issue management forecasts 
might be fundamentally different from firms that do not issue management forecasts, and our results might be 
driven by a specific cut of data. We address this sample-selection issue in three different ways. First, we use the 
propensity score matching strategy. For each firm that issues management forecasts, we select a firm that does 
not issue management forecasts but has a similar propensity for issuing such forecasts. We then examine market 
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reactions to analyst forecast revisions across the event time, using firms that issue management forecasts and their 
matching firms that do not issue management forecasts. Second, we exclude “quiet” firms (i.e., firms that do not 
issue management forecasts during four preceding quarters) from the sample and examine price reactions to 
analyst forecast revisions. Third, we estimate the return sensitivity regressions only with firms that issue 
management forecasts. Our results are robust across all specifications and samples. 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, this study contributes to the debate 
over the information role of security analysts. When piggybacking is controlled, the evidence shows that the 
previously documented temporal differences in price reactions to analyst forecast revisions disappear. This 
evidence is in line with findings from recent studies suggesting that analysts release little new information in 
their reports (Altınkılıç and Hansen 2009; Loh and Stulz 2011; Altınkılıç et al. 2013). Thus, our study 
expands the growing evidence of piggybacking (Altınkılıç and Hansen 2009, Altınkılıç et al. 2013). 
Second, this study sheds light on assessing the sources of value that analysts bring to the market. 
Although numerous studies find that analyst forecast revisions are price informative (e.g., Griffin 1976, 
Givoly and Lakonishok 1979, Givoly and Lakonishok 1980, Elton et al. 1981, Imhoff and Lobo 1984), there 
is contradicting empirical evidence on the relative importance of two different roles of analysts’ research: 
public information processing and information discovery (Francis et al. 2002; Ivković and Jegadeesh 2004; 
Frankel et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2010). Our study complements Livnat and Zhang (2012), which also 
examines the influence of firm disclosures in assessing analysts’ roles in processing public information and 
discovering private information. While Livnat and Zhang’s (2012) results are not free from the confounding 
effects of market reactions to disclosure itself, both studies find that the relative importance of analysts' 
information discovery role documented in prior studies is likely to be overstated. 
Our study also contributes to the literature on the economic consequences of management 
forecasts. Earlier studies find that analysts update their forecasts in response to management forecasts and 
that analyst forecasts become more accurate after management forecasts (Waymire 1986, Jennings 1987, 
Cotter et al. 2006). This study finds broader influences of management forecasts on the characteristics of 
analyst forecasts. The results suggest that some analysts piggyback their forecasts on guidance news just 
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as some do on earnings news. Consequently, the temporal pattern of piggybacking forecasts on earnings 
reports is broadened to encompass piggybacking forecasts on substantively similar guidance reports. The 
piggybacking clearly shows analysts’ use of recent earnings related news, which improves forecast 
accuracy. 
The paper’s results suggest that analysts’ information role is less relevant than previously 
believed and thus support the lack of evidence of new information from analysts. We caution, however, 
that our study does not suggest that analysts do not add value. Analysts have other important economic 
roles, such as raising investor awareness and monitoring managerial performance (Bhushan 1989, Hayes 
1998, Altınkılıç and Hansen 2000, Irvine et al. 2007).   
 
2. Research Design 
 This paper employs much of the very useful methodology introduced by Ivković and Jegadeesh 
(2004), drawing on their experimental design and the construction of statistics needed to assess the impact 
of forecast revisions. We augment their research design with the incidence and timing of management 
forecasts of quarterly earnings to understand analysts’ piggybacking behavior around corporate 
announcements of earnings and management forecasts and its effect on stock-price reactions around 
analyst forecast revisions.  
2.1. Sample Selection 
We obtain data on sell-side analyst forecasts of earnings per share (EPS) from the Institutional 
Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) detail tape and management forecasts of quarterly earnings from the 
Company Issued Guidelines (CIG) of Thomson Financial’s First Call Historical Database (FCHD) for the 
period between January 1996 and December 2009.3 We begin our sample period in 1996, because the 
passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 expanded safe-harbor protection to firms 
issuing forward-looking information and thus changed firms’ legal environment and incentives for issuing 
                                                          
3 We acknowledge that the CIG database is incomplete and management earnings forecasts of a group of firms 
might not be included (Houston et al. 2010, Chuk et al. 2013). Misclassifying firms with management earnings 
forecasts as those without management earnings forecasts, however, will work against finding any difference 
between these two groups of firms. 
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management forecasts. We focus on quarterly EPS forecasts that were revised after the prior-quarter (q-1) 
earnings announcement date. Since we examine analysts’ quarterly EPS forecasts, we focus on one-quarter-
ahead management forecasts of quarterly earnings. We obtain earnings announcement dates and financial 
data from the COMPUSTAT quarterly files and stock-return data from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) database.  
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the sample-selection process. We use analyst forecast revisions that 
are issued within 32 trading days after prior quarter earnings announcements and within 30 trading days 
before current earnings announcements. Sixty-two trading days between two consecutive earnings 
announcements usually span the entire quarter. To avoid the influence of changes in fiscal quarters or 
unusual delays in earnings announcements, we exclude forecast revisions issued between two consecutive 
earnings announcement dates that are less than 30 trading days or more than 100 trading days apart. We also 
exclude revisions later than 32 trading days after the prior-quarter earnings announcement and earlier than 
30 trading days before the current-quarter earnings announcement if there are more than 62 trading days 
between two consecutive earnings announcements.4 After eliminating forecast revisions for which stock 
returns around revisions are not available, we have 882,987 revisions. We drop revisions of which the 
absolute value of the forecast revision (changes in forecasts deflated by the last forecast before the revision) 
is greater than 50%, leaving 755,388 revisions. To avoid the effect of extreme values, we eliminate revisions 
with extreme price responses to revisions (top and bottom 0.05% of the distribution of price reactions). We 
also eliminate revisions with extreme values of individual and consensus forecast error, defined as greater 
than 100% of actual earnings. After we eliminate revisions of which control variables are not available, our 
final sample includes 670,879 revisions, of which 211,928 are upward revisions and 284,812 are downward 
revisions.5 The number of observations for which relative forecast accuracy is calculated (496,740 revisions) 
is smaller due to “day 0 exclusion” explained in section 2.3. The number of observations used for the 
regression analyses (384,786 revisions) is smaller, because we exclude forecast revisions made on the prior-
quarter earnings announcement date and on the day following the announcement.  
                                                          
4 Including these forecast revisions does not change the results in any material manner. 
5 We exclude the reiterating revisions of which the revised forecast is the same as the prior forecast.  
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Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution of the sample by year. Both the number of revisions and the 
average number of analysts following the firm increase over time. The distribution of the sample by Fama-
French 49 industry classification (untabulated) show that the most represented industry in terms of the number 
of revisions is Petroleum and Natural Gas, followed by Retail and Banking. In terms of the number of firms in 
the sample, Banking is the most represented industry, followed by Computer Software and Retail.    
2.2. Timing of Forecast Revisions  
 We measure the timing of analyst forecast revisions relative to quarter q-1 and quarter q earnings 
announcement dates. For each individual analyst revision of the one-quarter-ahead earnings forecast, we 
determine the number of trading days between the revision date and the earnings announcement date. For 
revisions made after the mid-point of the quarter, we measure revision timing relative to the current-
quarter (q) earnings announcement (trading days -30 through -1), and for revisions made at or prior to the 
mid-point of the quarter, we measure revision timing relative to the prior-quarter (q-1) earnings 
announcement (trading days 0 through 32). These trading days usually span the entire quarter. We then 
group the forecast revisions into the five periods based on timing. Figure 1 depicts the time line that shows 
five time periods and time indicator variable construction. We measure the timing of management forecasts 
based on the same five periods. We compare the temporal patterns of management forecasts and analyst 
forecast revisions at various points in the event time based on five periods defined in Figure 1. 
2.3. Relative Forecast Accuracy  
We calculate the relative forecast accuracy, RFA, as the absolute value of forecast error of the newly 
released one-quarter-ahead earnings forecast minus the absolute value of forecast error of the consensus 
forecast one day before the forecast revision, multiplied by -1.6 The consensus forecast summarizes the 
information available to all analysts prior to the forecast revision, whereas the new forecast conveys the 
incremental information upon which the analyst revises her/his forecast. A positive (negative) value of RFA 
indicates that the analyst’s revised forecast is more (less) accurate than the consensus forecast. To 
compute the consensus forecast, we require at least one analyst forecast issued prior to an analyst’s 
                                                          
6 Note that our RFA is the relative forecast error in Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) multiplied by negative one. 
Forecast accuracy is the inverse of forecast error, which is the absolute value of the difference between forecasted 
earnings and actual earnings. The smaller the forecast error, the greater is the forecast accuracy. 
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forecast revision. Under this definition, RFA is undefined on the earnings announcement date, because we 
cannot compute the consensus forecast for event day 0, where day 0 is the date of the quarter q-1 earnings 
announcement (“day 0 exclusion,” hereafter).  
We compare relative forecast accuracy between firms with management forecasts and those 
without management forecasts for each window of the five forecast periods defined in Figure 1. We also 
employ the following regression model to examine the temporal pattern of relative forecast accuracy: 
RFA = β1*DPeriod -2 + β2*DPeriod -1 + β3*DPeriod 1 +β4*DPeriod 2 + β6*SIZE  
 + β7*BM + β8*COVERAGE + β9*SPECIAL+ β10*LOSS + β11*DIFFICULTY + e     (1) 
 
All variable are defined in the Appendix. We exclude revisions in Period 0 (days (0, 1)) from the 
multivariate regressions due to “day 0 exclusion” and because the consensus forecast on day 1 exists only 
when at least one analyst issues forecast on day 0. Doing so is also consistent with our approach in the 
stock-price response analysis where we exclude such revisions to avoid the confounding effects of market 
reactions to earnings announcements. We control for the information environment that may affect analyst 
forecast accuracy. Following the prior literature, we control for firm size (Mikhail et al. 1997, Clement and 
Tse 2005), book-to-market ratio, and number of analysts following the firm (Stickel 1989). Inclusion of the 
number of analysts following the firm also controls for competition among analysts (Abarbanell et al. 1995). 
Earnings characteristics may also affect analysts’ forecast timing following earnings announcements 
(Stickel 1989, Zhang 2008). To control for earnings characteristics, we include analyst forecast errors for 
prior quarter earnings (Zhang 2008), an indicator for negative earnings (Hayn 1995), and special items in 
earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002).  We estimate equation (1) for the sample revisions for firms with 
and without management forecasts and compare the coefficients on DPeriod -2−DPeriod 2 between the 
two groups.  
2.4.  Stock-Price Responses to Forecast Revisions  
To examine whether management forecasts affect the return sensitivity to forecast revisions over 
the event time, we regress stock-price responses on forecast revisions interacted with event-time 
indicators for the subsample of revisions for firms with and without management forecasts. The 
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regression model uses revision timing in three periods: D1 (days (7, 32) and days (-30, -6)), D2 (days (-5, 
-1)), and D3 (days (2, 6)) (See Figure 1 for construction of time indicator variables). D1 corresponds to 
Periods -2 and 2, D2 corresponds to Period -1, and D3 corresponds to Period 1. 
Rt, t+2 = α0 +  α1*FR*D1 + α2*FR*D2 + α3*FR*D3 + α4*SIZE + α5*BM  
         +  α6*COVERAGE + α7*SPECIAL + α8*LOSS + α9*DIFFICULTY + η (2) 
The three event-time indicator variables, D2, D3, and D1, split the event time into three periods as the 
pre-, post-, and non-announcement periods, respectively. We exclude the event days (0, 1) because price 
reactions on these days include price reactions to the information contained in prior-quarter earnings 
announcements. We control for firms’ information environment and earnings characteristics. Excluding these 
control variables does not affect our results in any material way. Under the piggybacking hypothesis, 
forecast revisions in the period immediately prior to the current-quarter earnings announcements have 
greater price impacts than those in the period immediately prior to the current quarter earnings  (α2 > α3) 
only in the sample of firms that issue management forecasts.  
2.5.  Pre- and Post-Reg FD Periods  
      We also examine the timing and information content of analyst forecast revisions in pre- and 
post-Reg FD periods separately. Reg FD, which became effective on October 23, 2000, has changed the 
way that firms communicate with financial analysts and other market participants. Reg FD is intended to 
level the playing field and prohibits selective disclosure of material information to a subset of market 
participants, such as analysts and institutional investors, without simultaneously disclosing the same 
information to the investing public. For example, an advance warning about earnings telephoned to a 
security analyst must also be immediately released to the public. Following implementation of Reg FD, 
analysts no longer have access to manager’s private information before that information becomes public.  
 Prior studies show that Reg FD leads to changes in analysts’ information environment. Irani and 
Karamanou (2003) find a decrease in analyst following after the passage of Reg FD. Agrawal et al. (2006) 
find that individual and consensus forecasts become less accurate post-Reg FD, particularly for early 
forecasts and for smaller companies. Irani and Karamanou (2003), Agrawal et al. (2006), and Hahn and 
Song (2013) also find an increase in forecast dispersion following Reg FD. Janakiraman et al. (2007) 
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suggest that the timing advantage of favored analysts decrease after Reg FD. Specifically, they show that 
the first forecast horizon of favored analysts decrease more after Reg FD than that of other analysts. 
Changes in analysts’ information environment can potentially alter the relative precision of analysts’ 
information across event time and the value that the market attaches to revisions.  
More importantly, Kross and Suk (2012) show that Reg FD influences the interplay between 
management forecasts and analyst forecast revisions. Specifically, they find that the speed and frequency 
of individual analysts’ forecast revisions following public disclosures such as management forecasts 
increase dramatically after Reg FD. We define the sample period between 1996 and 2000 as the pre-Reg 
FD period and that between 2001 and 2009 as the post-Reg FD period.7 
 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1. Timing of Management Forecasts and Analyst Forecast Revisions 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the frequency of management forecasts over the event time. More than 
55% of management forecasts are issued on the prior-quarter earnings announcement date. Overall, about 
57% of management forecasts are issued during the announcement period of quarter q-1 earnings (Period 
0).8 Outside Period 0, Period -2 is the period in which most management forecasts are issued (about 
30%), followed by Period 2 (about 10%).  
The temporal pattern of the issuance of management forecasts drastically changes around Reg 
FD. During the pre-Reg FD period, less than 12% (14%) of management forecasts are issued at the time 
of the quarter q-1 earnings announcement (during the announcement period, Period 0). The majority of 
management forecasts (almost 62%) are issued in Period -2. In contrast, during the post-Reg FD period, 
about 63% (64%) of management forecasts are issued at the time of the prior-quarter earnings 
                                                          
7 Reg FD becomes effective in October 2000. Our results are qualitatively the same even if we exclude year 2000 
from the pre-FD period to avoid the transition effect. 
8 Although these prompt forecast revisions may provide valuable insights with respect to the analysts’ role in 
interpreting public information (Zhang 2008; Livnat ad Zhang 2012), they are less useful in our setting because it is 
virtually impossible to disentangle market reactions to forecast revisions from market reactions to prior-quarter 
earnings announcement itself. 
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announcement (during Period 0). Only about 25% are issued in Period -2. This dramatic shift might be 
attributable to changes in disclosure practices after Reg FD.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports the frequency of analyst forecast revisions over the event time. Timing of 
analyst forecast revisions are more dispersed than that of management forecasts but follow a similar temporal 
pattern. The shift in the temporal pattern around Reg FD for forecast revisions is also similar to the shift for 
management forecasts. This change in the temporal pattern of analyst forecast revisions around Reg FD seems to 
be more pronounced for firms that issue management forecasts than for firms without management forecasts.  
3.2.  Timing of Forecast Revisions and Relative Forecast Accuracy  
Table 3 reports relative forecast accuracy over five forecast periods. Forecast revisions in Period 0 
include only forecast revisions on day (1) due to “day 0 exclusion.”  For the full sample of forecast revisions, 
relative forecast accuracy in the pre-announcement period (Periods -2 and -1) is greater than those in the post-
announcement period (Periods 1 and 2). Relative forecast accuracy in Period -1 is lower than those in Period -2. 
We observe a similar temporal pattern of relative forecast accuracy in the pre- and post-Reg FD periods. The 
improvement in analyst forecast accuracy over time is more significant in the pre-Reg FD period than in the post-
Reg FD period, however, suggesting that the disappearance of implicit guidance after Reg FD might have 
decreased analysts’ information advantage later in the quarter (Janakiraman et al. 2007).9 
We also compare relative forecast accuracy between sample revisions for firms with management 
forecasts and those for firms without management forecasts. Relative forecast accuracy is greater for 
firms with management forecasts than those for firms without such forecasts. Greater improvement in 
forecast accuracy through the forecast revision for firms with management forecasts relative to those for 
firms without such forecasts are observed both in the pre- and post-Reg FD periods. This evidence 
suggests that analysts piggyback their forecasts on management forecasts. 
Table 4 reports results from the regression analysis. Because the residuals may be correlated across 
analysts and/or over time, we report test statistics and significance levels for all regressions based on standard 
errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the analyst and quarter levels (Petersen 2008, Gow et al. 2010). 
                                                          
9 Lower relative forecast accuracy in the post-Reg FD period are consistent with a decrease in analysts’ forecast 
quality after Reg FD (Agrawal et al. 2006). 
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The results including revisions in Period 0 (actually revisions on day (1) due to “day 0 exclusion”) are 
qualitatively the same as those tabulated in Table 4.10 
As shown in Table 4, consistent with results in Table 3, relative forecast accuracy in Period -2 is 
greatest, followed by those in Period -1, and then Period 2. We also compare relative forecast accuracy in 
different periods between firms with and without management forecasts. Again, consistent with results in 
Table 3, improvement in analyst forecast accuracy through the forecast revision is greater (i.e., greater 
coefficients on DPeriod -2, DPeriod -1, DPeriod 1, and DPeriod 2) for firms with management forecasts 
than for firms without management forecasts. Differences in coefficients are statistically significant at the 
one-percent level. Similar patterns are observed in both the pre- and post-Reg FD periods (untabulated). 
Improvement in analyst forecast accuracy through revisions is greater in the pre-announcement period than 
in the post-announcement period, and improvement in forecast accuracy is more pronounced for firms that 
issue management forecasts.  
To further understand the relation between management forecasts and the temporal pattern of relative 
forecast accuracy, we graph the frequency of management forecasts and the mean relative forecast accuracy 
for firms with and without management forecasts over the event time. In Figure 2, event time is expressed as 
the number of weeks from the prior-quarter earnings announcement or the current-quarter earnings 
announcement.  
As shown in Figure 2, the temporal pattern of relative forecast accuracy for firms that issue 
management forecasts is remarkably similar to the temporal pattern of the frequency of management 
forecasts. Specifically, relative forecast accuracy is higher in the period during which management 
forecasts are more frequently issued. For firms that do not issue management forecasts, the temporal 
pattern of relative forecast accuracy is not as apparent as for firms with management forecasts. The 
similarity in the temporal pattern of relative forecast accuracy and the frequency of management forecasts 
                                                          
10 We estimate forecast-accuracy regressions and price-reaction regressions for firms with and without management 
earnings forecasts separately, because we need to compare coefficients not only between two subsamples but also 
across different periods for each subsample. The results from the pooled regressions with an indicator variable for 
the revisions with management earnings forecasts, along with interactions of the indicator variable and other 
variables, are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
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over the event time is even more pronounced in the post-Reg FD period, potentially because revisions in 
the pre-Reg FD period are influenced not only by management forecasts but also by implicit and selective 
management guidance of quarterly earnings. This evidence is consistent with Kross and Suk (2012) who 
find increases in analysts’ use of public information such as management forecasts after Reg FD. 
3.3.  Price Reactions to Forecast Revisions   
In this section, we examine whether the information content of analyst forecast revisions at 
various points in the event time differs depending on whether or not firms issue management forecasts. 
Under the piggybacking hypothesis, stock-price responses between pre- and post-announcement periods 
are expected to differ only in the sample of firms that issue management forecasts, but not in the sample 
of firms without such forecasts. 
We estimate regression equation (2) and report the results for the entire sample period (1996-2009) 
in Panel A of Table 5. Again, we report test statistics and significance levels for all regressions based on 
standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the analyst and quarter levels. In Panel A, for the 
full sample of forecast revisions, the coefficient on FR*D3 is smaller than the coefficients on FR*D1 and 
FR*D2. When we partition the sample into forecast revisions for firms with and without management 
forecasts, however, the full sample results hold only for the sample of firms that issue management 
forecasts. For firms that do not issue management forecasts, the coefficient on FR*D2 and the coefficient on 
FR*D3 are not statistically different (t-value = 0.58), suggesting that the price impact of analyst forecast 
revisions in the post-announcement period is comparable to that of revisions in the pre-announcement 
period. The stock-price reaction to revisions is the strongest in D1. In Table 2, we show that management 
forecasts are most frequent in Periods -2 and 2, which corresponds to D1 in Table 5. Thus, the strongest 
market reaction to revisions in this period might actually be the reaction to management forecasts, not 
analyst forecast revisions. 
 We also find that stock-price responses to forecast revisions are greater for firms with management 
forecasts than for firms without management forecasts during the non-announcement period (D1) and in the 
period immediately before the current-quarter earnings announcement (D2), while the opposite holds in the 
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period immediately following the prior-quarter earnings announcement (D3). Because management 
forecasts are most frequent in Period -2, as shown in Table 2, and because analysts tend to revise forecasts 
over several days subsequent to management forecasts (Cotter et al. 2006), it appears that the temporal 
pattern of management forecasts affect the different temporal patterns of the information content of 
revisions between firms with and without management forecasts. This evidence is consistent with analysts 
piggybacking their reports on recent management forecasts. If analysts piggyback their reports on recent 
public news, then abnormal returns around analyst forecast revisions will show the arrival of early news. 
Figure 3 shows the median of the absolute value of abnormal returns over days -5 to 3 around analyst 
forecast revisions with and without management forecasts. The graph shows that stock-price reactions start 
on days -2 and -1 for firms that issue management forecasts, suggesting an early arrival of news. This 
phenomenon is less pronounced for analyst forecast revisions for firms without management forecasts. 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the regression results for pre- and post- Reg FD periods. Again, for both pre- 
and post-Reg FD subperiods, weaker (stronger) stock-price responses to forecast revisions in the post-
announcement (pre-announcement) period holds only in the sample of revisions for firms that issue management 
forecasts. In the sample of revisions for firms that do not issue management forecasts, the difference in the 
coefficient on FR*D2 and that on FR*D3 is statistically insignificant. Thus, it appears that the temporal 
difference in the price impact of forecast revisions is driven by the temporal pattern of management forecasts.  
We also estimate regressions for upward and downward revisions separately and summarize the 
results in Table 6. For upward forecast revisions, Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) find that the coefficient 
on FR*D2 is greatest, followed by the coefficient on FR*D1. They find that the coefficient on FR*D3 is 
negative. We find that such results hold only for the pre-Reg FD period. For the post-Reg FD period, the 
difference between the coefficient on FR*D1 and that on FR*D2 is statistically insignificant. For the 
sample of downward revisions, we find that the coefficient on FR*D1 is the greatest. 
More importantly though, the finding that the coefficient on FR*D3 is smaller than that on FR*D2 
(i.e., weaker return responses to forecast revisions in the period immediately following the earnings 
announcement than those in the period immediately prior to the earnings announcement) holds only for 
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upward and downward revisions for firms that issue management forecasts. For firms that do not issue 
management forecasts, stock-price responses to forecast revisions in the week following the prior-quarter 
earnings announcement are statistically indifferent from those in the week immediately before the current-
quarter earnings announcement, except for upward revisions in the pre-Reg FD period.11  
Next, we directly control for the confounding effect of management forecasts by including 
management forecast news to the regression equation (5). We identify management forecasts issued between 
one day prior to and two days after individual analysts’ forecast revision and compute management forecast 
news, MF, as management forecast minus mean consensus analyst forecast on the day before the issuance of 
management forecast, deflated by the absolute value of mean consensus analyst forecast. We assign zero value 
to MF if there is no management forecast issued prior to analyst forecast revision. We interact MF with the 
three event-time indicator variables, D2, D3, and D1, that split the event time into three periods as the pre-, 
post-, and non-announcement periods, respectively. If management forecast is a confounding factor that 
explains the temporal pattern of the market reaction to forecast revisions, the difference between the coefficient 
on FR*D2 and the coefficient on FR*D3 will become insignificant once we control for the effect of 
management forecast news.  
Panel A of Table 7 reports the results. The number of observations in this table is smaller than 
that in Table 5 as observations with qualitative management forecasts are excluded because MF cannot be 
calculated for qualitative forecasts. The results with the full sample of analyst forecast revisions show 
significantly positive price impact of management forecasts issued in pre-announcement (D2) and non-
announcement periods (D1).  More importantly, the difference between the coefficient on FR*D2 and the 
coefficient on FR*D3 is insignificant after controlling for the effect of management forecast news. We 
find the similar results for both the pre-FD and post-FD periods. Thus the evidence in Table 7 suggests 
that the weaker (stronger) price reaction to analyst forecast revisions issued immediately after (before) the 
earnings announcement is largely attributable to the confounding effect of management forecasts. 
                                                          
11 Selective disclosure to a group of analysts may contribute to a greater price impact of upward revisions in the pre-
announcement period during the pre-Reg FD period. 
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In Panel A of Table 7, the analyses include both firms that issue management forecasts and firms 
that do not. If the two types of firms are fundamentally different, our results could be driven by 
differences in the two types of firms rather than by the confounding effect of voluntary public disclosures. 
To mitigate this concern, we confine observations to ones that are subject to issuance of management 
forecasts and report the results in Panel B of Table 7. Again, observations with qualitative management 
forecasts are excluded. The coefficient on FR*D2 is statistically insignificant. In addition, the difference 
between the coefficient on FR*D2 and the coefficient on FR*D3 is insignificant, suggesting that the 
different return sensitivity to forecast revisions between pre- and post-announcement periods disappears 
once the confounding effect of management forecasts is controlled for.  
We also control for a potential interaction effect of MF and FR by including the set of 
covariates with interactions MF*FR*D1, MF*FR*D2, and MF*FR*D3 in the model. We further refine 
return sensitivity to confirmatory and dissenting analyst forecasts by splitting MF*FR interactions into 
Max(MF*FR, 0) and Min(0, MF*FR). Inclusion of interactions and consideration of confirmatory and 
dissenting analyst forecasts do not change the tenor of the results. These results are also robust to firm 
fixed effects, as shown in Panel C of Table 7. 
3.4. Sample selection bias 
Sample selection bias is potentially an issue for our analyses, as firms that issue management 
forecasts might be fundamentally different from firms that do not issue management forecasts. Although 
analyses in Panels B and C of Table 7 mitigate this concern, we further address the sample selection issue in 
two additional ways. First, we use the propensity score matching strategy. For each firm that issues 
management forecasts, we select a firm that does not issue management forecasts but has a similar 
propensity for issuing management forecasts.12 We then examine the market reaction to analyst forecast 
revisions across the event time using firms that issue management forecasts and their matching firms that 
                                                          
12 Propensity score is estimated by the following logistic regression for each fiscal quarter: Pr(MEF=1) = F(α0 + α1 
LN_TA + α2 BIG4 + α3 BETA + α4 ABSCHGROA + α5 STD_AF + α6 EARNINGS_VOLATILITY + α7 ASSET_GROWTH 
+ α8 LEVERAGE + α9 SEGMENTS + α10 ROA + α11 LOSS + α12 HHI + α13 LITIGATION + α14 COVERAGE). All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. For each fiscal quarter, firms with the closest propensity score are matched 
within caliper width of 0.1 without replacement.  
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do not issue management forecasts. Table 8 reports the results. The number of observations for the 
matched guidance firm sample and that for the matched non-guidance firm sample is different because 
propensity score matching is done at the firm-quarter level, but the analysis is done at the forecast 
revision level. There could be more than one analyst forecast revision for each firm quarter. The results 
confirm our earlier findings that the market reaction to analyst forecast revisions is significantly different 
only for the subsample of firms that issue management forecasts. Moreover, the significant difference in 
the market reaction to analyst forecast revisions between pre- and post-announcement periods disappears 
once management forecasts are controlled for.  
Second, we exclude “quiet” firms from the sample and re-estimate the return sensitivity 
regressions. We exclude analyst forecast revisions for firms that do not issue management forecasts for 
four preceding quarters, because they are generally quiet firms and the information flow for these firms 
could be minimal and therefore fundamentally different from firms that issue management forecasts. We 
report the results in Table 9. As shown, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 5 
and 7. The significant difference in return sensitivity to analyst forecast revisions between pre- and post-
announcement periods disappears when management forecasts are controlled for.13   
3.5. Timing of Other Information Events and Return Sensitivity to Forecast Revisions   
In addition to earnings announcements and management forecasts, other information events could 
confound return reactions to analyst forecast revisions. Following Altınkılıç and Hansen (2009), Loh and 
Stulz (2011), and Altınkılıç et al. (2013), we consider additional information events, including security 
offerings, multiple analyst recommendations, mergers and acquisitions, and dividend declarations, and 
examine the effect of such events on return sensitivity to forecast revisions across the event time. We 
obtain equity offerings and debt offerings from Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) Global New Issue 
database, multiple analyst recommendations from I/B/E/S, mergers and acquisitions from the SDC 
mergers and acquisitions database, and data on dividend declarations from CRSP.  
                                                          
13 Inclusion of firm fixed effects, the interaction of analyst forecast revisions and management forecast news, and 
confirmatory/dissenting analyst forecasts in Tables 8 and 9 do not change the tenor of the results. 
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Panel A of Table 10 summarizes the timing of information events. Similar to management forecasts 
and analyst forecast revisions, other information events are frequent during the earnings announcement 
period (i.e., days 0 and 1 around quarterly earnings announcements). Unlike management forecasts and 
analyst forecast revisions, however, other information events occur more frequently during Period 2 (i.e., 
days (7, 32)) than in Period -2 (i.e., days (-30, -6)). Considering the lag between information events and 
analyst forecasts piggybacking on these events, information events in Period -2 could affect market 
reactions to analyst forecast revisions in Period -2 as well as those in Period -1 (i.e., days (-5, -1)). Less 
frequent other information events during Period -2 suggest that analysts are more likely to piggyback on 
management forecasts than on other information events during the pre-announcement period. 
We also examine market reactions to analyst forecast revisions conditional on other information 
events. We first exclude analyst forecast revisions for firms issuing management forecasts from the sample. 
We then divide the remaining analyst forecast revisions into revisions with other information events and 
those without. Panel B of Table 10 reports the results. As shown, the market reaction to analyst forecast 
revisions is not statistically different between pre- and post-announcement periods for both forecast 
revisions with and without other information events. The result in Panel B of Table 10 confirms the 
evidence in earlier tables (i.e., the difference in the market reaction to forecast revisions between pre- and 
post-announcement periods is significantly different only for forecast revisions with management forecasts) 
and suggests that other information events play a less significant role than that of management forecasts in 
determining market reactions to analyst forecast revisions. In Panel C of Table 10, we include management 
forecasts in information events and test market reactions to analyst forecast revisions with and without all 
information events. When we include management forecasts in information events, the difference in market 
reactions to analyst forecast revisions between pre- and post-announcement period becomes significant for 
forecast revisions with information events. This result is consistent with those in Table 5 and suggests that 
differential market reactions to analyst forecast revisions between pre- and post-announcement periods can 
be attributed primarily to the confounding effect of management forecasts. 
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3.6. Market Reactions to Management Forecasts and Other Information Events Conditional on 
Analyst Forecast Revisions   
 
Considering that analysts’ career paths and wealth are associated with their forecast accuracy (e.g., 
Mikhail et al. 1999, Altınkılıç et al. 2013), analysts’ incentive for piggybacking on management forecasts 
would be greater in the pre-announcement period, when management forecasts become very accurate. In our 
sample, the mean value of management forecast error, calculated as management forecast minus actual 
earnings scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings is 0.0001 in Period -2 and -0.0009 in Period -1, 
both of which are insignificantly different from zero, suggesting that management forecasts issued in these 
periods are very accurate.  
While information events can confound return responses to analyst forecast revisions, analyst 
forecast revisions may also confound return responses to information events. We examine market 
reactions to management forecasts with or without analyst forecast revisions in the vicinity (i.e., days (-1, 
+5) around management forecasts). Specifically, we regress three-day cumulative abnormal returns on the 
interaction of management forecast news, MF, and the period indicators (i.e., D1, D2, and D3). 
Untabulated results show that the magnitudes of coefficients on MF*D1 and MF*D3 are larger for firms 
with analyst forecasts than for those without analyst forecasts. The coefficients on MF*D2, however, are 
not significantly different between the two subsamples. This evidence suggests that while analyst 
forecasts may affect market reactions to management forecasts to some degree in the non-announcement 
and post-announcement periods, the incremental information from analyst forecasts is not significant in 
the pre-announcement period. Market reactions to management forecasts are strongest during the pre-
announcement period and weakest during the post-announcement period. The strong market reaction to 
management forecasts during the pre-announcement period could provide incentives for analysts to 
piggyback on management forecasts during this period. 
We also examine market reactions to other information events with or without analyst forecast 
revisions in the vicinity (i.e., days (-1, +5) around information events). Unlike in the case of management 
forecasts, for which we can determine the direction and the magnitude of news by comparing 
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management forecasts to existing consensus analyst forecasts, we cannot reliably determine whether such 
events as equity/debt offerings or mergers and acquisitions deliver good or bad news. Therefore, for other 
information events, we regress the absolute value of three-day cumulative abnormal returns around other 
information events on the period indicators (i.e., D1, D2, and D3). Untabulated results show that while 
market reactions in the non-announcement period are stronger for information events with analyst 
forecasts in the vicinity than for those without analyst forecasts, market reactions in the pre-
announcement periods are not different between the two subsamples. Thus, incremental information from 
analyst forecasts is not significant in the pre-announcement period. Similar to the case of management 
forecasts, the market reaction is strongest in the pre-announcement period.  
 
4. Conclusions  
Previous studies credit strong stock-price reactions around analyst forecast revisions immediately 
before earnings announcement to significant new information from analysts. Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004), 
for example, find that the precision of the information that analysts provide varies with event time, 
following patterns consistent with the plausible availability of private and public information, and conclude 
that the value of analyst forecasts stems primarily from analysts’ ability to collect and process private 
information. They, however, neither control for the confounding effect of public disclosures nor consider 
analysts’ piggybacking behavior. Our study introduces new and unique tests of the “informed analyst 
hypothesis” and the “piggybacking hypothesis” and offers insights on the role of management information 
release. We provide evidence suggesting that the temporal difference in the price impact of forecast 
revisions across the event time is driven largely by the confounding effect of management forecasts. 
The temporal pattern of analyst forecast revisions across the event time relative to earnings 
announcements mimics the temporal pattern of management forecasts. Furthermore, the temporal pattern of 
relative forecast accuracy and that of management forecasts are remarkably similar. Improvement in 
analysts’ forecast accuracy through revisions is greater for firms that issue management forecasts. More 
importantly, the evidence of weaker stock-price responses to forecast revisions in the period immediately 
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after the prior-quarter earnings announcement holds only for the sample of firms that issue management 
forecasts. For firms that do not issue management forecasts, stock-price responses to forecast revisions in 
the week following the prior-quarter earnings announcement are as strong as those in the week immediately 
before the current-quarter earnings announcement. This result is more pronounced in the post-Reg FD 
period. We further show that the weaker (stronger) price reaction to forecast revisions issued immediately 
after (before) the earnings announcement disappears when we control for the effect of management 
forecasts news. Thus the results suggest that management forecasts affect the price impact of forecast 
revisions over the event time. 
Our results are robust to three different approaches that address the sample selection concern and 
are consistent across different specifications, which include firm fixed effects, the interaction of analyst 
forecast revisions and management forecast news, and confirmatory/dissenting analyst forecasts. Overall, 
evidence suggests that management forecasts are related to the timing as well as the relative accuracy and 
information content of analyst forecast revisions across the event time. To the extent that management 
forecasts are public disclosures, our results cast doubt on the “informed analyst hypothesis.” Rather, the 
results are consistent with analysts piggybacking their reports on recent public information events 
(Altınkılıç and Hansen 2009, Altınkılıç et al. 2013).  
 Management forecasts are motivated by a desire to align analyst and investor expectations with 
information that management possesses. While analysts piggyback their forecasts on management forecasts, 
management’s decision to release information is endogenous. That is, managers make voluntary disclosure 
decisions based on the perceived costs and benefits of such disclosures and the potential impact on analyst 
expectations. Although a full exploration of the endogenous decision that management makes for information 
release and its impact on analyst information environment would be interesting, it is beyond the scope of this 
paper. We leave such an investigation to future research.  
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Appendix 
Variable definitions 
 
Variable name Definition 
ABSCHGROA absolute value of the change in ROA (earnings before extraordinary items 
scaled by lagged total assets) from quarter q-4 to quarter q 
ASSET_GROWTH percentage asset growth from quarter q-4 to quarter q 
BETA market beta using daily return data estimated over the past one  year period 
BIG4 an indicator variable that takes the value of one if one of Big 4 is the external 
auditor, and zero otherwise 
BM book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the end of 
quarter q-1 
COVERAGE natural logarithm of the number of analysts who issue quarterly EPS forecast 
between quarter q-1 and quarter q earnings announcement dates 
D1 an indicator of non-announcement period which takes the value of one if an 
analyst’s forecast is issued between days (-30, -6) or (7, 32), and zero 
otherwise 
D2 an indicator of pre-announcement period which takes the value of one if an 
analyst’s forecast is issued between days (-5, -1), and zero otherwise 
D3 an indicator of post-announcement period which takes the value of one if an 
analyst’s forecast is issued between days (2, 6), and zero otherwise 
DIFFICULTY analysts’ mean consensus forecast error for quarter q-1 EPS 
DPeriod -2 (-1, 1, or 2) an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the forecast revision is 
issued in Period -2 (-1, 1, or 2), and zero otherwise ,where Period -2 includes 
days (-30, -6) relative to quarter q earnings announcement, Period -1 includes 
days (-5, -1) relative to quarter q earnings announcement, Period 1 includes 
days (2, 6) relative to quarter q-1 earnings announcement, and Period 2 
includes days (7, 32) relative to quarter q-1 earnings announcement. 
EARNINGS_VOLATILITY standard deviation of quarterly ROA over the past seven years (requiring at 
least three non-missing observations) 
FR individual analyst forecast revision deflated by the absolute value of prior 
forecast. Specifically, for every forecast revision made by analyst i for stock j 
on day t, we define forecast revision FR as follows: FRijt = 100 x 
[(new_forecastijt – old_forecastij) / Abs(old_forecastij)] where new_forecastijt 
is the revised forecast on day t and old_forecastij is the last forecast by the 
same analyst before the revision. We truncate FR at ±50%. 
HHI Hirfindahl index using revenues of all firms in the same four-digit SIC code 
LEVERAGE ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the beginning of the quarter  
LITIGATION an indicator variables as of one if SIC code is in (2833–2836, 3570–3577, 
3600–3674, 5200-5961, or 7370–7374) 
LN_TA natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the quarter 
LOSS an indicator variable that takes the value of one if quarter q-1 EPS is negative, 
and zero otherwise 
Max(MF*FR, 0) equals MF*FR if management forecast and analyst forecast revisions are both 
good news (i.e., both MF and FR are positive) or both bad news (i.e., both MF 
or FR are negative), and zero otherwise 
MEF an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm issues management 
forecast during the quarter, and zero otherwise 
Min(0, MF*FR) equals MF*FR if management forecast is good (bad) news forecast but 
analyst forecast revisions is bad (good) news forecast revision, and zero 
otherwise 
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MF news from management forecasts issued between one day prior to and two 
days after an individual analyst’s forecast revision, calculated as 
management’s earnings forecasts minus mean consensus analyst forecast 
computed on the day before the issuance of management forecasts, deflated 
by the absolute value of mean consensus analyst forecast 
RFA relative forecast accuracy, calculated as (the absolute value of an individual 
analyst's newly revised forecast error minus the absolute value of the mean 
consensus forecast error measured one day before the analyst’s forecast 
revision, deflated by absolute value of actual earnings) multiplied by (-1). 
Specifically, for every new earnings forecast made by analyst i for stock j on day 
t, we define the relative current forecast accuracy RFAijt as: RFAijt = (FEijt – 
CFEjt-1) x (-1) where FEijt = 100 x Abs[(analyst_forecastijt – 
quarterly_earningsj) / quarterly_earningsj]; and CFEjt-1 = 100 x 
Abs[(consensus_forecastjt-1 – quarterly_earningsj) / quarterly_earningsj]. We 
truncate both FEijt and CFEjt-1 at 100%. We compute the consensus forecast 
one day before the forecast revision (CFEjt-1) as the arithmetic average of each 
analyst’s last forecast issued since the quarter q-1 earnings announcement. 
ROA earnings before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets 
Rt,t+2   cumulative abnormal stock returns over three-day window from day t through 
day t+2 where day t is the date of forecast revision; Specifically, Rt, t+2 = 
2 ( )t VWCRSP
t
r rτ τ ττ
= +
= −∑  where τr  and 
VWCRSPrτ  denote raw returns on the stock and the 
return on the value-weighted CRSP index. 
SEGMENTS natural logarithm of the total number of geographic and operating segments 
SIZE natural logarithm of the firm’s market value of equity at the end of quarter q-1 
SPECIAL COMPUSTAT special items divided by sales for quarter q-1 
STD_AF analyst forecast dispersion measured as the standard deviation of individual 
analyst forecasts for quarter q 
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Figure 1  
Timeline 
 
 
  q-1 earnings  
announcement 
    q earnings  
announcement 
 
Quarters for which revisions  q -1 q q + 1 
are used           
           
Trading days and period            
indicators relative to  -30, …, -6 -5, …, -1 0 1 2, …, 6 7, …, 32 -30, …, -6 -5, …, -1 0 1 
earnings announcement dates Period -2 Period -1 Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 Period -2 Period -1 Period 0 
           
Period indicators for return 
sensitivity test D1=1 D2=1   D3=1 D1=1 D1=1 D2=1   
 
Forecast revisions are grouped into the following five periods based on timing: 
Period -2: days (-30, -6) (non-immediate pre-announcement period of quarter q earnings); 
Period -1: days (-5, -1) (immediate pre-announcement period of quarter q earnings); 
Period 0: days (0, 1) (announcement period of quarter q-1 earnings); 
Period 1: days (2, 6) (immediate post-announcement period of quarter q-1 earnings); and 
Period 2: days (7, 32) (non-immediate post-announcement period of quarter q-1 earnings). 
where quarter q is the quarter for which earnings are being forecasted. Trading days -30 through -1 are measured as the number of trading days relative to EADq and 
trading days 0 through 32 are measured as the number of trading days relative to EADq-1. Period 0 is further divided into Day 0 and 1 relative to EADq-1. 
 
 28
Figure 2 
Frequency of management earnings forecast and relative forecast accuracy for firms with and 
without management forecasts 
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The bar graph presents frequency of management earnings forecasts (MEFs) over the event time. The line 
graphs present the mean relative forecast accuracy for firms with and without MEF over the event time. 
Event time is expressed as the number of weeks from the prior-quarter earnings announcement (for 
revisions made at or before the midpoint of the quarter) or the current quarter earnings announcement (for 
revisions made after the midpoint of the quarter) except Week 1. Week 1 includes only day (1), the first 
trading day after the prior-quarter earnings announcement. Relative forecast accuracy is undefined for 
revisions on the prior-quarter earnings announcement date due to day 0 exclusion. The greater magnitude 
of relative forecast accuracy represents more accurate analyst forecast relative to the existing consensus 
forecast. Left-side Y-axis represents relative forecast accuracy and right-side Y-axis represents the 
frequency of MEFs.  
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Figure 3  
Abnormal returns around analyst forecast revisions 
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The line graph presents changes in stock returns around analysts’ forecast revision date for firms with and 
without management earnings forecasts (MEFs). The X-axis represents the number of trading days 
relative to an analyst forecast revision date and Y-axis represents the median of the absolute value of 
market-adjusted abnormal stock returns on the event day.   
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Table 1 
Sample selection and distribution 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
 
  One quarter ahead analyst forecast revisions from IBES detail file 1,028,348
Less: Revisions issued between two consecutive earnings announcement dates that 
are less than 30 trading days apart or more than 100 trading days apart  (68,878) 
  Less: Revisions issued later than 32 trading days after the previous earnings 
announcement and earlier than 30 trading days before the current earnings 
announcement (39,006) 
Less: Revisions of which stock returns are not available (37,477)
Less: Revisions of which the absolute value of the revision is greater than 50% (127,599)
Less: Revisions with extreme values of stock returns (top and bottom 0.05% of the 
distribution) (691) 
Less: Revisions with extreme values of individual and consensus forecast error 
(greater than 100%)  (52,177) 
Less: Revisions of which control variables are not available (31,641)
Number of observations for revision timing distributions in Table 2 670,879
  
Less: Revisions of which relative forecast accuracy cannot be determined (174,139) 
Number of revisions with relative forecast accuracy in Table 3 496,740 
  
Less: Revisions issued on the day after the earnings announcement (111,954) 
Number of revisions used for regressions in Tables 4 and 5 384,786 
 
Panel B: Sample distribution by year 
 
Year Number of Revisions # of firms 
Average Number of Analyst 
Following the Firm 
1996 19,953 2,366 2.85 
1997 20,321 2,531 2.82 
1998 24,682 2,671 3.14 
1999 24,636 2,539 3.33 
2000 19,355 2,224 3.36 
2001 28,967 2,295 4.00 
2002 29,376 2,333 3.91 
2003 35,116 2,374 4.18 
2004 44,509 2,642 4.56 
2005 46,912 2,870 4.57 
2006 49,068 3,011 4.52 
2007 49,883 3,094 4.50 
2008 55,960 3,045 4.77 
2009 48,002 2,750 5.03 
Total 496,740 2,625 4.06 
 
Panel A summarizes the sample selection procedure. Panel B presents the sample distribution by year. 
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Table 2 
Timing of management forecasts and analyst forecast revisions 
 
Panel A: Timing of management forecasts  
 
  1996-2009 Pre-Reg FD Post-Reg FD
Period N % N % N %
-2 7,833 30.12 2,381 61.91 5,452 24.6
-1 751 2.89 324 8.42 427 1.93
(Day 0) 14,356 55.19 457 11.88 13,899 62.71
(Day 1) 374 1.44 69 1.79 305 1.38
1 193 0.74 51 1.33 142 0.64
2 2,503 9.62 564 14.66 1,939 8.75
Total 26,010 100 3,846 100 22,164 100
 
Panel B: Timing of analyst forecast revisions 
 
1996-2009 Full Sample with MEF without MEF 
Period N % N % N %
-2 184,413 27.49 60,369 30.72 124,044 26.15
-1 30,159 4.50 9,190 4.68 20,969 4.42
(Day 0) 78,776 11.74 22,600 11.50 56,176 11.84
(Day 1) 189,940 28.31 60,169 30.62 129,771 27.36
1 82,830 12.35 17,669 8.99 65,161 13.74
2 104,761 15.62 26,499 13.49 78,262 16.50
Total 670,879 100 196,496 100 474,383 100
       
Pre-Reg FD Full Sample with MEF without MEF 
Period N % N % N %
-2 48,002 33.88 11,527 43.17 36,475 31.72
-1 6,866 4.85 1,492 5.59 5,374 4.67
(Day 0) 5,492 3.88 652 2.44 4,840 4.21
(Day 1) 25,719 18.15 4,262 15.96 21,457 18.66
1 24,227 17.10 3,588 13.44 20,639 17.95
2 31,393 22.15 5,183 19.41 26,210 22.79
Total 141,699 100 26,704 100 114,995 100
       
Post-Reg FD Full Sample with MEF without MEF 
Period N % N % N %
-2 136,411 25.78 48,842 28.77 87,569 24.37
-1 23,293 4.40 7,698 4.53 15,595 4.34
(Day 0) 73,284 13.85 21,948 12.93 51,336 14.28
(Day 1) 164,221 31.03 55,907 32.93 108,314 30.14
1 58,603 11.07 14,081 8.29 44,522 12.39
2 73,368 13.86 21,316 12.55 52,052 14.48
Total 529,180 100 169,792 100 359,388 100
   
Panel A reports the frequency of management earnings forecasts (MEFs) over the event time based on five forecast 
periods between consecutive two quarterly earnings announcement dates (EADs). See Figure 1 for classification of 
forecast periods. In this table, Period 0 is further divided into Day 0 and Day 1 relative to EADq-1. We define years 
between 1996 and 2000 as pre-Reg FD and between 2001 and 2009 as post-Reg FD. In Panel B, we further divide 
sample revisions into revisions by firms that issue management earnings forecasts (with MEF) and those by firms 
that do not issue management earnings forecasts (without MEF) during the quarter.  
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Table 3 
Forecast revision timing and relative forecast accuracy 
 
 Full Sample with MEF without MEF Difference 
1996-2009             
Period N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean p-value  Median p-value  
-2 183,147 4.62 2.08 60,166 9.05 4.88 122,981 2.46 1.08 6.60 <0.01 3.80 <0.01 
-1 30,025 3.77 1.54 9,170 7.66 3.67 20,855 2.05 0.85 5.61 <0.01 2.82 <0.01 
0 111,954 0.43 0.00 38,343 0.77 0.00 73,611 0.25 0.00 0.51 <0.01 0.00 <0.01 
1 70,643 -0.38 0.00 16,122 -0.07 0.00 54,521 0.47 0.00 0.40 <0.01 0.00 <0.01 
2 100,971 1.52 0.65 26,191 3.67 1.58 74,780 0.77 0.28 2.90 <0.01 1.30 <0.01 
Total 496,740  149,992 346,748  
            
Pre-Reg FD           
Period N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean p-value  Median p-value  
-2 47,298 6.22 2.55 11,439 14.06 8.51 35,859 3.71 1.52 10.34 <0.01 7.00 <0.01 
-1 6,797 5.42 2.20 1,480 11.96 7.12 5,317 3.60 1.43 8.36 <0.01 5.69 <0.01 
0 6,546 1.20 0.00 1,265 1.66 0.00 5,281 1.10 0.00 0.56 0.10 0.00 0.02 
1 19,178 -0.19 0.00 3,104 0.32 0.00 16,074 -0.29 0.00 0.61 <0.01 0.00 0.03 
2 29,128 2.06 0.66 5,010 5.56 2.48 24,118 1.33 0.38 4.23 <0.01 2.10 <0.01 
Total 108,947  22,298 86,649  
            
Post-Reg FD           
Period N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean p-value Median p-value 
-2 135,849 4.07 1.90 48,727 7.88 4.22 87,122 1.94 0.87 5.94 <0.01 3.35 <0.01 
-1 23,228 3.28 1.39 7,690 6.84 3.21 15,538 1.52 0.66 5.31 <0.01 2.54 <0.01 
0 105,408 0.38 0.00 37,078 0.74 0.00 68,330 0.19 0.00 0.55 <0.01 0.00 <0.01 
1 51,465 -0.45 0.00 13,018 -0.16 0.00 38,447 -0.55 0.00 0.39 <0.01 0.00 <0.01 
2 71,843 1.31 0.64 21,181 3.22 1.42 50,662 0.50 0.22 2.72 <0.01 1.19 <0.01 
Total 387,793  127,694 260,099  
 
This table reports summary statistics of relative analyst forecast accuracy, RFA, over five forecast periods. See Figure 1 for classification of forecast periods. All variables 
are defined in the Appendix. RFA on day (0) is not defined due to day 0 exclusion. We test the difference in RFA between revisions by firms that issue management 
earnings forecasts (with MEF) and those by firms that do not issue management earnings forecasts (without MEF) during the quarter. We define years between 1996 
and 2000 and pre-Reg FD and between 2001 and 2009 as post-Reg FD. Test of difference in means is based on t-test and test of difference in median is based on 
Wilcoxon rank sum test. Two-tailed p-values are reported.  
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Table 4 
Forecast revision timing and relative forecast accuracy - Regression Analysis 
 
 Full Sample with MEF without MEF
    
Difference between revisions 
with and without MEF 
 coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value difference t-value
DPeriod -2 9.087 17.93 *** 16.766 16.10 *** 4.944 10.73 *** 11.822 11.09 ***
DPeriod -1 8.344 14.17 *** 15.617 12.57 *** 4.596 10.16 *** 11.021 8.88 ***
DPeriod 1 3.926 8.81 *** 7.462 7.39 *** 1.879 4.51 *** 5.583 5.41 ***
DPeriod 2 5.942 13.02 *** 11.448 11.20 *** 3.207 7.73 *** 8.241 7.96 ***
SIZE -0.764 -8.83 *** -1.169 -7.57 *** -0.289 -4.34 *** -0.880 -5.59 ***
BM -0.099 -0.49 0.638 1.08 0.257 1.57 0.381 0.68
COVERAGE 0.834 4.10 *** 0.668 2.22 ** -0.090 -0.65 0.757 2.41 **
SPECIAL -2.598 -1.55 -1.451 -0.42 -2.467 -1.65 * 1.016 0.28
LOSS -1.030 -4.28 *** -0.077 -0.12 -0.902 -4.20 *** 0.825 1.26
DIFFICULTY -0.119 -0.55 -0.715 -1.29 0.568 2.63 *** -1.283 -2.16 **
   
N 384,786 111,649 273,137 
Adj. R-sq. 0.062 0.196 0.020 
 
DPeriod -2 = DPeriod -1 3.42 *** 2.37 ** 2.34 **
DPeriod -2 = DPeriod 1 23.88 *** 24.82 *** 19.67 ***
DPeriod -2 = DPeriod 2 19.44 *** 16.39 *** 13.97 ***
DPeriod -1 = DPeriod 1 14.26 *** 14.39 *** 14.10 ***
DPeriod -1 = DPeriod 2 8.81 *** 7.31 *** 8.31 ***
DPeriod 1 = DPeriod 2 13.29 *** 11.27 *** 10.33 ***
 
This table reports the results of the regression of relative forecast accuracy (RFA) on period indicators and control variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. We 
divide sample revisions into revisions by firms that issue management earnings forecasts (with MEF) and those by firms that do not issue management earnings 
forecasts (without MEF) during the quarter. All test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at 
the analyst and quarter levels. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 5 
Forecast revision timing and return sensitivity to forecast revisions 
 
Panel A: Full sample period: 1996-2009 
 
 Full Sample with MEF without MEF
   
Difference between revisions 
with and without MEF
 coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value difference t-value
Intercept 0.057 0.36 -0.475 -1.49 0.238 1.68 * -0.713 -2.32 **
FR*D1 0.069 20.03 *** 0.117 18.10 *** 0.042 15.82 *** 0.076 12.08 ***
FR*D2 0.045 7.62 *** 0.091 8.45 *** 0.020 5.00 *** 0.071 7.02 ***
FR*D3 0.015 5.88 *** 0.008 1.62 0.017 6.66 *** -0.010 -2.04 **
SIZE 0.008 0.31 0.024 0.46 -0.014 -0.73 0.038 0.76
BM 0.187 3.05 *** 0.519 3.20 *** 0.092 1.39 0.427 2.39 **
COVERAGE -0.092 -1.75 * -0.009 -0.07 -0.049 -1.03 0.039 0.30
SPECIAL -0.054 -0.14 -0.610 -0.67 -0.134 -0.32 -0.476 -0.47
LOSS -0.102 -1.06 -0.042 -0.19 -0.168 -1.55 0.126 0.50
DIFFICULTY 0.221 4.26 *** 0.219 1.32 0.142 2.99 *** 0.077 0.45
  
N 384,786  111,649 273,137
Adj. R-sq. 0.029  0.075 0.012
  
FR*D1=FR*D2  4.43 *** 2.43 ** 4.99 ***
FR*D2=FR*D3  5.00 *** 7.43 *** 0.58
FR*D3=FR*D1  14.09 *** 15.98 *** 7.18 ***
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Panel B: All forecast revisions: Pre- and Post-Reg FD periods 
 
 Full Sample with MEF without MEF
    
Difference between revisions 
with and without MEF
 coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value difference t-value
Pre-Reg FD  
Intercept -0.082 -0.27 -0.938 -1.43 0.110 0.38 -1.049 -1.63
FR*D1 0.049 10.08 *** 0.091 8.01 *** 0.029 10.62 *** 0.062 5.87 ***
FR*D2 0.029 3.53 *** 0.055 2.44 ** 0.017 2.51 ** 0.039 1.64
FR*D3 0.009 1.77 * 0.010 0.96 0.009 1.58 0.001 0.08
Control variables  Included Included Included
  
N 102,401  21,033 81,368
Adj. R-sq. 0.014  0.040 0.005
  
FR*D1=FR*D2  2.34 ** 1.62 1.71 *
FR*D2=FR*D3  2.28 ** 1.75 * 0.98
FR*D3=FR*D1  5.59 *** 6.85 *** 3.24 ***
Post-Reg FD  
Intercept 0.072 0.38 -0.374 -1.03 0.255 1.55 -0.629 -1.83 *
FR*D1 0.077 18.47 *** 0.125 16.10 *** 0.047 14.10 *** 0.077 10.06 ***
FR*D2 0.051 6.89 *** 0.102 8.52 *** 0.021 4.25 *** 0.081 7.33 ***
FR*D3 0.017 5.98 *** 0.007 1.38 0.020 7.65 *** -0.013 -2.63 ***
Control variables  Included Included Included
  
N 282,385  90,616 191,769
Adj. R-sq. 0.037  0.088 0.015
  
FR*D1=FR*D2  3.97 *** 1.98 ** 4.88 ***
FR*D2=FR*D3  4.56 *** 7.79 *** 0.14
FR*D3=FR*D1  13.72 *** 14.46 *** 6.89 ***
 
This table reports the results of the following regression of stock returns on analyst forecast revisions at different points in event time relative to the earnings announcement 
date and control variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. We divide sample revisions into revisions by firms that issue management earnings forecasts 
(with MEF) and those by firms that do not issue management earnings forecasts (without MEF) during the quarter. Panel A presents regression results for revisions 
over the entire sample period (1996-2009), and Panel B presents results for revisions during the pre- and post-Reg FD periods. We define years between 1996 and 
2000 and pre-Reg FD period and between 2001 and 2009 as post-Reg FD period. All test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors 
adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the analyst and quarter levels. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 6 
Upward and downward revisions: forecast revision timing and return sensitivity to forecast revisions 
 
Panel A: Upward revisions 
 
 Full Sample with MEF without MEF
    
Difference between revisions 
with and without MEF
 coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value difference t-value
Pre-Reg FD  
Intercept 1.304 3.81 *** 0.948 1.30 1.423 4.40 *** -0.475 -0.69
FR*D1 0.014 2.22 ** 0.065 4.01 *** 0.001 0.15 0.065 4.35 ***
FR*D2 0.049 3.04 *** 0.081 2.54 ** 0.037 2.43 ** 0.043 1.33
FR*D3 -0.014 -0.95 -0.002 -0.08 -0.016 -1.08 0.015 0.98
Control variables  Included Included Included
  
N 41,267  6,974 34,293
Adj. R-sq. 0.003  0.016 0.002
  
FR*D1=FR*D2  2.79 *** 0.64 2.63 ***
FR*D2=FR*D3  2.57 ** 2.08 ** 2.15 **
FR*D3=FR*D1  1.74 * 2.76 ***  1.10
Post-Reg FD  
Intercept 2.955 12.71 *** 4.048 8.86 *** 2.312 10.60 *** 1.736 3.49 ***
FR*D1 0.036 10.97 *** 0.065 8.97 *** 0.018 5.37 *** 0.046 5.49 ***
FR*D2 0.035 4.29 *** 0.062 4.70 *** 0.013 1.61 0.049 3.31 ***
FR*D3 -0.011 -2.39 ** -0.036 -4.06 *** -0.002 -0.30 -0.034 -2.98 ***
Control variables  Included Included Included
  
N 120,121  38,809 81,312
Adj. R-sq. 0.013  0.031 0.006
  
FR*D1=FR*D2  0.10 0.20 0.63
FR*D2=FR*D3  4.44 *** 6.46 *** 1.38
FR*D3=FR*D1  8.85 *** 8.97 ***  3.68 ***
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Panel B: Downward revisions 
 
 Full Sample with MEF without MEF 
          
Difference between revisions 
with and without MEF 
 coeff. t-value  coeff. t-value  coeff. t-value  difference t-value  
Pre-Reg FD      
Intercept -0.954 -2.19 ** -2.741 -2.31 ** -0.836 -2.51 ** -1.906 -1.63   
FR*D1 0.039 5.75 *** 0.052 3.45 *** 0.016 3.89 *** 0.035 2.29 ** 
FR*D2 -0.004 -0.44   -0.001 -0.06   -0.019 -1.76 * 0.018 0.72   
FR*D3 -0.008 -1.31   -0.051 -2.83 *** -0.006 -0.83   -0.045 -2.20 ** 
Control variables  Included  Included  Included   
  
N 61,134 14,059 47,075
Adj. R-sq. 0.006 0.011 0.002
FR*D1=FR*D2  4.07 ***  2.32 **  3.49 ***    
FR*D2=FR*D3  0.41    1.87 *  1.14      
FR*D3=FR*D1  5.06 ***   8.38 ***   2.62 ***       
Post-Reg FD     
Intercept -1.872 -8.73 *** -3.540 -6.82 *** -1.212 -7.14 *** -2.328 -4.51 *** 
FR*D1 0.065 10.14 *** 0.101 8.09 *** 0.034 6.50 *** 0.067 5.35 *** 
FR*D2 0.023 2.30 ** 0.065 3.43 *** -0.006 -0.88   0.071 3.75 *** 
FR*D3 -0.008 -1.62   -0.030 -3.75 *** -0.002 -0.58   -0.028 -3.70 *** 
Control variables  Included  Included  Included   
  
N 162,264 51,807 110,457
Adj. R-sq. 0.018 0.039 0.006
FR*D1=FR*D2  4.73 ***  1.91 *  5.83 ***    
FR*D2=FR*D3  2.98 ***  5.23 ***  0.46      
FR*D3=FR*D1  10.63 ***   11.87 ***   5.45 ***       
 
This table reports the results of the regression of stock returns on analyst forecast revisions at different points in event time relative to the earnings announcement date and 
control variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. We divide sample revisions into revisions by firms that issue management earnings forecasts (with MEF) 
and those by firms that do not issue management earnings forecasts (without MEF) during the quarter. Panel A (B) presents results for upward (downward) revisions 
during the pre- and post-Reg FD periods. We define years between 1996 and 2000 and pre-Reg FD and between 2001 and 2009 as post-Reg FD. All test statistics and 
significance levels are calculated based on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the analyst and quarter levels. ***, **, * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 7 
Forecast revision timing and return sensitivity to forecast revisions after controlling for news from management forecasts 
 
Panel A. Return sensitivity to forecast revisions after controlling for management forecasts 
 
 Full Sample Pre-FD Post-FD
   
 coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value
Intercept 0.155 1.02 -0.023 -0.08 0.201 1.08
FR*D1 0.044 17.32 *** 0.030 10.94 *** 0.049 15.48 ***
FR*D2 0.018 4.23 *** 0.005 0.53 0.023 4.89 ***
FR*D3 0.016 6.68 *** 0.009 1.81 * 0.018 7.09 ***
MF*D1 0.149 15.64 *** 0.140 6.48 *** 0.151 14.24 ***
MF*D2 0.306 9.65 *** 0.419 8.93 *** 0.283 8.12 ***
MF*D3 -0.009 -0.99 -0.012 -0.28 -0.011 -1.12
SIZE -0.013 -0.57 -0.016 -0.41 -0.013 -0.47
BM 0.131 2.26 ** 0.079 0.64 0.153 2.44 **
COVERAGE -0.026 -0.52 0.085 1.03 -0.055 -0.88
SPECIAL -0.412 -1.06 -2.118 -2.56 ** 0.065 0.16
LOSS -0.110 -1.23 0.006 0.03 -0.155 -1.59
DIFFICULTY 0.135 2.65 *** 0.151 1.16 0.141 2.51 **
 
N 380,854   100,942   279,912   
Adj. R-sq. 0.050   0.032   0.059   
 
FR*D1=FR*D2 6.25 *** 2.80 *** 5.76 ***
FR*D2=FR*D3 0.36 0.52 0.82
FR*D3=FR*D1 8.65 *** 3.72 *** 8.25 ***
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Panel B. Return sensitivity to forecast revisions for firms with management forecasts  
 
 coeff. t-value  coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  
Intercept -0.080 -0.25 -0.156 -0.48 -0.194 -0.61
FR*D1 0.059 12.95 *** 0.059 12.85 *** 0.059 13.01 ***
FR*D2 0.014 1.56 0.014 1.54 0.014 1.53
FR*D3 0.011 2.47 ** 0.011 2.54 ** 0.011 2.49 **
MF*D1 0.134 14.92 *** 0.138 14.37 *** 0.140 14.84 ***
MF*D2 0.310 9.36 *** 0.304 9.84 *** 0.304 9.82 ***
MF*D3 -0.005 -0.51 0.004 0.40 0.005 0.48
MF*FR*D1 0.032 1.11
MF*FR*D2 -0.067 -0.59
MF*FR*D3 0.070 1.84 *
Max(MF*FR, 0)*D1 0.039 1.32
Max(MF*FR, 0)*D2 -0.065 -0.57
Max(MF*FR, 0)*D3 0.075 1.88 *
Min(0, MF*FR)*D1 -0.304 -2.14 **
Min(0, MF*FR)*D2 -0.180 -0.37
Min(0, MF*FR)*D3 -0.013 -0.13
SIZE -0.023 -0.45 -0.015 -0.29 -0.011 -0.22
BM 0.390 2.46 ** 0.391 2.48 ** 0.388 2.47 **
COVERAGE 0.054 0.44 0.047 0.39 0.045 0.36
SPECIAL -1.382 -1.48 -1.408 -1.48 -1.435 -1.51
LOSS -0.131 -0.58 -0.126 -0.56 -0.132 -0.58
DIFFICULTY 0.093 0.49 0.085 0.45 0.077 0.40
 
N 110,295 110,295 110,295
Adj. R-sq. 0.108 0.108 0.108
 
FR*D1=FR*D2 4.75 *** 4.73 *** 4.69 ***
FR*D2=FR*D3 0.30 0.22 0.24
FR*D3=FR*D1 8.49 *** 8.22 *** 8.38 ***
 
 
 40
Panel C. Return sensitivity to forecast revisions for firms with management forecasts - firm fixed effect model 
 
 coeff. t-value  coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  
FR*D1 0.054 32.12 *** 0.054 32.13 *** 0.053 31.92 ***
FR*D2 0.007 1.58 0.007 1.58 0.007 1.57
FR*D3 0.012 3.44 *** 0.013 3.58 *** 0.012 3.49 ***
MF*D1 0.133 54.67 *** 0.138 52.65 *** 0.139 52.85 ***
MF*D2 0.296 32.80 *** 0.293 31.69 *** 0.293 31.70 ***
MF*D3 -0.004 -0.63 0.004 0.55 0.004 0.61
MF*FR*D1 0.035 4.96 ***
MF*FR*D2 -0.055 -2.06 **
MF*FR*D3 0.061 2.77 ***
Max(MF*FR, 0)*D1 0.041 5.65 ***
Max(MF*FR, 0)*D2 -0.054 -1.98 **
Max(MF*FR, 0)*D3 0.064 2.81 ***
Min(0, MF*FR)*D1 -0.217 -3.85 ***
Min(0, MF*FR)*D2 -0.159 -0.43
Min(0, MF*FR)*D3 0.019 0.15
SIZE -0.643 -12.10 *** -0.629 -11.82 *** -0.623 -11.70 ***
BM 0.290 2.43 ** 0.293 2.45 ** 0.288 2.41 **
COVERAGE -0.397 -4.94 *** -0.410 -5.10 *** -0.414 -5.14 ***
SPECIAL -1.957 -2.64 *** -2.016 -2.72 *** -2.034 -2.75 ***
LOSS 0.192 2.12 ** 0.196 2.17 ** 0.194 2.15 **
DIFFICULTY 0.058 0.63 0.053 0.58 0.050 0.54
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
       
N 110,295   110,295   110,295   
Adj. R-sq. 0.096 0.097 0.097
FR*D1=FR*D2 9.68 *** 9.69 *** 9.63 ***
FR*D2=FR*D3 0.84 0.94 0.89
FR*D3=FR*D1 10.90 *** 10.73 *** 10.68 ***
 
This table reports the results of the regression of stock returns on analyst forecast revisions at different points in event time relative to the earnings announcement date and 
control variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. In Panel A, we define years between 1996 and 2000 and pre-Reg FD period and between 2001 and 2009 as 
post-Reg FD period. Test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the analyst and quarter 
levels.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 8 
Propensity-score matching: forecast timing and return sensitivity to forecast revisions 
 
Pooled Matched Sample  
after controlling for management forecasts 
 
Matched 
Guidance Firm 
Sample 
Matched 
Non-Guidance Firm 
Sample 
Difference between 
matched guidance and 
non-guidance Matched Sample 
Firms
Pre-FD Post-FD 
 coeff. t-value  coeff. t-value differenc t-value coeff. t-value  coeff. t-value  coeff. t-value  
Intercept -0.348 -0.47   0.673 1.97 ** -1.021 -1.29   0.233 0.59   -1.583 -2.89 *** 0.779 1.84 * 
FR*D1 0.112 10.69 *** 0.041 7.92 *** 0.071 6.98 *** 0.050 8.92 *** 0.032 3.66 *** 0.055 7.70 *** 
FR*D2 0.060 3.00 *** 0.019 1.65 * 0.041 1.83 * 0.021 2.28 ** -0.012 -0.46   0.029 3.27 *** 
FR*D3 0.021 3.32 *** 0.023 4.98 *** -0.002 -0.24   0.022 5.14 *** 0.013 1.16   0.024 5.16 *** 
MF*D1          0.128 6.07 *** 0.054 2.61 *** 0.159 7.43 *** 
MF*D2          0.181 2.65 *** 0.080 1.17   0.256 3.13 *** 
MF*D3          -0.003 -0.22   -0.042 -1.36   0.003 0.21   
SIZE 0.032 0.31   -0.108 -2.00 ** 0.140 1.10   -0.055 -1.15   0.091 1.22   -0.100 -2.02 ** 
BM 0.467 1.78 * -0.232 -1.43   0.698 2.52 ** 0.006 0.04   0.325 1.34   -0.070 -0.41   
COVERAGE 0.045 0.22   0.216 2.37 ** -0.171 -0.68   0.186 2.09 ** 0.331 1.49   0.133 1.43   
SPECIAL -2.088 -0.99   -1.700 -2.04 ** -0.389 -0.16   -1.828 -1.43   -5.909 -5.05 *** -0.646 -0.43   
LOSS -0.337 -0.87   0.404 2.18 ** -0.742 -1.72 * 0.017 0.09   -0.047 -0.15   0.018 0.08   
DIFFICULTY 0.423 1.40   -0.008 -0.05   0.430 1.37   0.063 0.41   -0.076 -0.35   0.135 0.71   
                   
N 75,927   78,510      153,487   33,281   120,206   
Adj. R-sq. 0.070   0.012      0.057   0.020   0.077   
                   
FR*D1=FR*D  2.83 ***  1.63       2.60 ***  1.46    2.49 ** 
FR*D2=FR*D  1.83 *  0.28       0.00    0.76    0.54   
FR*D3=FR*D  7.82 ***   3.30 ***         4.99 ***   2.25 **   4.44 *** 
 
This table reports the results of the regression of stock returns on analyst forecast revisions at different points in event time relative to the earnings announcement date and 
control variables for the propensity-score matched sample. Propensity score is estimated by the following logistic regression for each fiscal quarter: Pr(MEF=1) = F(α0 
+ α1 LN_TA + α2 BIG4 + α3 BETA + α4 ABSCHGROA + α5 STD_AF + α6 EARNINGS_ VOLATILITY + α7 ASSET_GROWTH+ α8 LEVERAGE + α9 SEGMENTS + α10 
ROA + α11 LOSS + α12 HHI + α13 LITIGATION + α14 COVERAGE). All variables are defined in the Appendix. For each fiscal quarter, firms with closest propensity 
score are matched within caliper width of 0.1 without replacement. We define years between 1996 and 2000 and pre-Reg FD period and between 2001 and 2009 as 
post-Reg FD period. All test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the analyst and quarter 
levels. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 9 
Excluding quiet firms: forecast revision timing and return sensitivity to forecast revisions 
 
Pooled Sample  
after controlling for management forecasts 
 
With MEF  Without MEF Difference between With and without MEF All revisions Pre-FD Post-FD 
 coeff. t-value  coeff. t-value difference t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-valu
Intercept -0.374 -1.14   0.157 0.72  -0.532 -1.46   0.123 0.58   -0.281 -0.68   0.220 0.90   
FR*D1 0.118 18.27 *** 0.052 15.13 *** 0.066 10.90 *** 0.055 17.36 *** 0.041 9.13 *** 0.060 15.41 *** 
FR*D2 0.093 8.75 *** 0.028 4.19 *** 0.066 6.25 *** 0.020 3.39 *** 0.005 0.36   0.025 3.87 *** 
FR*D3 0.009 1.86 * 0.016 4.70 *** -0.008 -1.67 * 0.015 4.73 *** 0.016 3.21 *** 0.014 3.81 *** 
MF*D1         0.139 15.22 *** 0.125 5.68 *** 0.141 14.59 *** 
MF*D2         0.303 8.96 *** 0.420 7.31 *** 0.281 7.67 *** 
MF*D3         -0.006 -0.65   -0.001 -0.01   -0.006 -0.64   
SIZE 0.016 0.31   -0.002 -0.07  0.018 0.32   -0.019 -0.59   -0.037 -0.60   -0.014 -0.39   
BM 0.536 3.30 *** 0.243 2.72 *** 0.293 1.52  0.283 4.00 *** 0.343 2.13 ** 0.285 3.63 *** 
COVERAGE -0.027 -0.21   -0.089 -1.55  0.062 0.45  -0.022 -0.28   0.198 1.49   -0.079 -0.86   
SPECIAL -0.134 -0.14   -0.544 -0.86  0.410 0.35  -0.688 -1.19   -3.945 -2.66 *** -0.087 -0.14   
LOSS -0.018 -0.08   -0.009 -0.05  -0.008 -0.03  -0.041 -0.31   0.135 0.57   -0.087 -0.57   
DIFFICULTY 0.150 0.87   0.049 0.54   0.101 0.49  0.043 0.48   0.086 0.55   0.029 0.27   
                  
N 104,474   96,537     199,767   43,251   156,516   
Adj. R-sq. 0.077   0.016     0.076   0.049   0.087   
                  
FR*D1=FR*D2  2.45 **  3.72 ***    6.09 ***  2.61 ***  5.86 *** 
FR*D2=FR*D3  7.63 ***  1.44      0.77    0.82    1.39   
FR*D3=FR*D1  16.09 *** 7.81 ***    10.10 *** 4.33 *** 9.58 *** 
 
This table reports the results of regression of stock returns on analyst forecast revisions at different points in event time relative to the earnings announcement date and control 
variables for the sample firms that have earnings forecast at least once during the quarters between q-3 and q. All variables are defined in the Appendix. We define years 
between 1996 and 2000 and pre-Reg FD period and between 2001 and 2009 as post-Reg FD period. All test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on 
standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the analyst and quarter levels. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Table 10 
Timing of other information events and return sensitivity to forecast revisions 
 
Panel A: Timing of firm information events 
 
  Events excluding Management forecasts Events including Management forecasts
Period N %   N %
-2 2,958 14.98 10,791 23.58
-1 283 1.43 1,034 2.26
0 4,102 20.77 18,832 41.15
1 3,057 15.48 3,250 7.10
2 9,349 47.34 11,852 25.90
Total 19,749 100.00 45,759 100.00
 
Panel B: Return sensitivity to forecast revisions conditional on events during the quarter after excluding management forecast event observations 
 
 Full Sample 
With events 
(excluding MEF) Without Events 
Difference between revisions 
with and without Events 
 coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value difference t-value
Intercept 0.238 1.68 * 0.416 2.33 ** 0.146 0.88 0.271 1.35
FR*D1 0.042 15.82 *** 0.051 16.00 *** 0.038 13.00 *** 0.014 4.45 ***
FR*D2 0.020 5.00 *** 0.028 3.57 *** 0.017 3.67 *** 0.011 1.26 **
FR*D3 0.017 6.66 *** 0.021 5.65 *** 0.014 4.25 *** 0.007 1.49
SIZE -0.014 -0.73 -0.018 -0.63 -0.014 -0.64 -0.004 -0.14
BM 0.092 1.39 0.209 1.66 * 0.033 0.49 0.177 1.38 *
COVERAGE -0.049 -1.03 -0.152 -2.30 ** 0.001 0.02 -0.153 -2.06 **
SPECIAL -0.134 -0.32 -0.528 -0.65 0.034 0.06 -0.562 -0.55
LOSS -0.168 -1.55 -0.428 -2.85 *** -0.035 -0.31 -0.393 -2.80
DIFFICULTY 0.142 2.99 *** 0.217 2.91 *** 0.107 1.97 ** 0.111 1.32 **
  
N 273,137  84,233 188,904
Adj. R-sq. 0.012  0.016 0.010
  
FR*D1=FR*D  4.99 *** 3.12 *** 3.87 ***
FR*D2=FR*D  0.58 0.70 0.53
FR*D3=FR*D  7.18 *** 7.20 *** 5.31 ***
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Panel C: Return sensitivity to forecast revisions conditional on events during the quarter including management forecast (MEF) 
 
 Full Sample 
With events 
(including MEF) Without Events 
Difference between revisions 
with and without Events 
 coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value difference t-value
Intercept 0.057 0.36 0.040 0.20 0.146 0.88 -0.106 -0.52
FR*D1 0.069 20.03 *** 0.094 21.22 *** 0.038 13.00 *** 0.057 14.16 ***
FR*D2 0.045 7.62 *** 0.070 8.28 *** 0.017 3.67 *** 0.053 6.33 ***
FR*D3 0.015 5.88 *** 0.015 5.35 *** 0.014 4.25 *** 0.001 0.37
SIZE 0.008 0.31 0.016 0.46 -0.014 -0.64 0.029 0.90
BM 0.187 3.05 *** 0.347 3.74 *** 0.033 0.49 0.314 3.05 ***
COVERAGE -0.092 -1.75 * -0.156 -2.07 ** 0.001 0.02 -0.157 -1.91 *
SPECIAL -0.054 -0.14 -0.383 -0.59 0.034 0.06 -0.417 -0.46
LOSS -0.102 -1.06 -0.207 -1.64 * -0.035 -0.31 -0.171 -1.18
DIFFICULTY 0.221 4.26 *** 0.283 3.41 *** 0.107 1.97 ** 0.177 1.88 *
  
N 384,786  195,882 188,904
Adj. R-sq. 0.029  0.049 0.010
  
FR*D1=FR*D2  4.43 *** 3.09 *** 3.87 ***
FR*D2=FR*D3  5.00 *** 6.14 *** 0.53
FR*D3=FR*D1  14.09 *** 16.35 *** 5.31 ***
 
This table reports the results of regression of stock returns on analyst forecast revisions and firm informational events at different points in event time relative to the earnings 
announcement and control variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Firm informational events include debt and equity issues, multiple analyst recommendations, 
merger and acquisition, and dividend declaration. In Panel B and C, all test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors adjusted by a two-
dimensional cluster at the analyst and quarter levels. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed).   
 
 
 
 
